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Abstract
Following three generations of buyback contracts, the new model of Iranian petroleum contracts (IPC) was introduced by the 
Iranian cabinet to incentivize investments in the country. This paper analyzes the fiscal terms of the contract with technical 
information from one of the candidate fields for licensing. The financial simulation shows that, in general, the IPC resembles 
more a service contract than a production sharing contract as the contractor’s take is relatively low—below 5% across dif-
ferent scenarios of crude oil price. Second, the IPC is progressive in that as the overall profitability of the project improves 
the government takes an increasing share of the economic rent. The results are confirmed in a sensitivity analysis of each 
party’s profitability and takes on oil price, CAPEX, OPEX and the fee.
Keywords Iranian petroleum contract (IPC) · Fiscal regime · Government take · Progressive · Petroleum rent
1 Introduction
Iran has the one of the largest oil reserves in the world.1 Tra-
ditionally, Iran has relied on buyback contracts for awarding 
upstream petroleum licenses to international oil companies. 
A buyback contract is essentially a service contract under 
which a foreign company develops an oil or gas deposit and 
recovers its costs and a pre-negotiated remuneration fee from 
sales revenues, but has no share in the project’s profit. Once 
the field starts production, the investment is handed over to 
National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) who will take over 
the operation of the field2 (van Groenendaal and Mazraati 
2006). It was first adopted by the Iranian government in 
1993. For more than 20 years, the buyback contract was the 
main apparatus of petroleum licensing in Iran.
Technically speaking, a buyback contract is a type of risk 
service contract in that all costs are born by the foreign com-
pany who can only recover its costs and the agreed remu-
neration if the field produces at its agreed level and the price 
is high enough. In other words, the foreign company’s cost 
recovery and remuneration depends on the field’s perfor-
mance. The terms of the buyback contract had been revised 
three times by the national oil company resulting in three 
generations of buyback contracts (Maddahinasab 2017). 
Despite these alterations, Iran was not very successful in 
raising the required investment for its petroleum industry. An 
oft-voiced critique from international oil and gas companies 
is that the period of the contractor’s involvement in the field 
is so short, usually between 5 and 7 years, that Iran’s oil and 
gas recovery will not be optimized, as the contractor is not 
incentivized to maximize the long-term recovery.3
In order to attract foreign investment to the oil and gas 
sector, in 2017 the Iranian government introduced a new 
generation of upstream oil and gas contracts called Iranian 
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1 According to BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2019, Iran’s 
proved oil reserve is ranked  4th in the world after Venezuela, Saudi 
Arabia and Canada. However, if we exclude Venezuela’s heavy oil 
from the Orinoco belt and Canadian oil sands, Iran is the second larg-
est country in oil reserve, next only to Saudi Arabia.
2 Once the field reaches the targeted rate of production—which is 
agreed upon by the parties- and can keep for 21 days out of a period 
of 28 consecutive days, the foreign company will hand over the oper-
ation to NIOC.
3 In this paper, the word ‘investor,’ ‘contractor, and ‘foreign com-
pany’ will be used inter-changeably.
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petroleum contract (IPC) with more rewarding conditions 
to foreign investors. In this new framework, the Iranian 
authorities sought to rectify the deficiencies of the buyback 
contract. For example, the term of the contract is extended 
to a maximum of 20 years from the start of development. If 
enhanced oil recovery projects are to be implemented, the 
term can extend up to another 5 years and if exploration is 
included in the contract, then that period will be added to the 
contract.4 The remuneration fee within the IPC framework 
is based on production rate and set as a fee per barrel of oil 
or per cubic foot of gas. In contrast, the fee was paid as a 
percentage of total capital costs under the buyback contract, 
which could lead to the so-called gold plating.5 Elements of 
progressivity such as an R-factor are also included in the IPC 
remuneration scheme.
What are the implications of the new IPC framework to 
investors? Is the fiscal regime under the IPC framework pro-
gressive or regressive? To what extent the IPC resembles the 
traditional buyback contract or the more prevalent produc-
tion sharing agreement? These questions are the focus of 
this paper.
Since the Iranian government revealed its plans of setting 
up a new contract in 2015, a number of papers have ana-
lyzed the contract terms, mostly from a legal and contractual 
perspective, focusing on such issues as the similarities and 
differences between the IPC, the buyback and production 
sharing contracts; risk sharing mechanisms, and the progres-
sivity of the IPC. See, for example, Shahri (2015), Ebrahimi 
and Shahmoradi (2017), Maddahinasab (2017) and Asghar-
ian (2017). Very few papers have focused on the financial 
implications of the IPC to the investor and the host govern-
ment with the exception of Soleimani and Tavakolian (2017) 
and Sahebhonar et al. (2016).6 Soleimani and Tavakolian 
(2017) compare the efficiency of the buyback contract to 
that of IPC using a number of financial metrics including the 
government take, the net present value (NPV), the internal 
rate of return (IRR), discounted payback period and the pre-
sent value ratio. Although the paper ran several scenarios, it 
does not give a clear explanation of many of the underlying 
assumptions such as the capital expenditure, the operating 
expenditure. It is also unclear why the NPV and IRR of the 
contractor (in all cases of small, medium and large field) 
remain almost unaffected when the price scenarios change. 
Sahebhonar et al. (2016) deal with the financial aspects of 
the IPC using an Iranian offshore field in the Caspian Sea 
region, however, since it focuses on a specific type of fields 
(deep offshore), the generality of its results is limited.
This paper focuses on the financial implications of the 
IPC to the host government and investors. We calculate the 
“take” statistic, which shows the division of profits between 
the host government and the investor over the life cycle of 
the contract, and analyzes how it changes under different 
oil price scenarios. The analysis is illustrated using a finan-
cial model with technical information from the third phase 
development of a real oil field located in the South of Iran. 
The results demonstrate that, in general, the IPC is progres-
sive that as the overall profitability of the project improves 
the government takes an increasing share of the economic 
rent. A sensitivity analysis of each party’s profitability and 
‘takes’ on oil price, the base remuneration fee, the capital 
expenditure and the operating expenditure further corrobo-
rates this result.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. After the 
introduction, Sect. 2 describes the fiscal arrangements of the 
IPC. Section 3 presents the model setup and assumptions 
for key parameters and scenarios. The results of financial 
modeling as well as a sensitivity analysis are reported in 
Sect. 4. Section 5 concludes.
2  The fiscal arrangement of IPC
In contrast to the buyback contract under which the investor 
does not play any role in the production phase, under the IPC 
the foreign company is allowed to participate in all phases of 
upstream activities including exploration, development and 
production. The investor recovers all its accrued costs from 
the proceeds of oil and gas from the field. In addition, it also 
benefits from the profit of the field via a per barrel remunera-
tion fee. Figure 1 illustrates the division of the total revenue 
between the investor and the government. The details of each 
cost item and the remuneration fee are discussed below.
2.1  The cost categories of IPC
• Direct capital costs: these include field development and 
appraisal costs needed for achieving the development 
goals, which are further divided into two categories.
• Direct capital costs for achieving primary production 
goals: the costs that are evaluated before the contract 
is signed. These costs are stipulated in the contract, 
not changeable and will be totally recovered.
5 In taxation, “gold-plating” refers to the attempts by companies to 
inflate costs through overspending on projects.
6 In addition, a number of papers have analyzed the optimal produc-
tion rate and efficiency of risk service contracts. For example, see 
Luo and Zhao (2013), Ghandi and Lin (2012), and Ghandi and Lin 
Lawell (2017).
4 According to Clifford Chance (2017), the term of contract is up to 
26 years, including 4 years for exploration, 2 years for appraisal and 
up to 20 years from the start of development operations. If necessary, 
it can be further extended by up to 7 years (2 years for the exploration 
phase and 5 years for enhanced oil recovery).
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• Direct capital costs for reaching next phase of tar-
gets: the costs that are required to achieve the next 
phase of targets are approved based on predictions, 
primary production, reservoir behavior and field 
development project. Submission of an annual work 
program and budget that is approved by the joint 
development committee (JDC) and NIOC is a condi-
tion for paying this portion of the capital cost. Devia-
tion from the work program should not be more than 
5%. The recovery of these costs is neither guaranteed 
nor fixed in the contract and depends on the reservoir 
behavior and market conditions and can be adjusted 
annually.
• Indirect capital costs: include all costs paid by the foreign 
company to government agencies such as customs, pen-
sions and national insurance costs, etc. These costs are 
also recoverable, but are limited to those paid within the 
country borders.
• Cost of money: These are the financial costs, including 
interest payment relating to indirect costs or delay in cost 
recovery. The base interest rate for these costs is LIBOR 
plus an agreed premium.7
• Operating costs (OPEX): These include all costs and 
expenses incurred and paid by the contractor relating to 
the operation and maintenance of the field such as labor, 
consumables and energy.
All costs paid by the contractor will be recovered from 
field’s proceeds in the form of “cost petroleum.” Accord-
ing to Iranian Cabinet Resolution (2016), the amount of 
petroleum for cost recovery and payment of the remunera-
tion fee will be capped at a maximum of 50% of crude or 
condensate and up to 75% of gas produced or equivalent 
revenues based on market prices.8 That is, no more than 
50% of oil revenue (75% of gas revenue) from the field can 
be used to recover the investor’s costs. Unrecovered costs 
can be carried forward to next year(s).
Direct or indirect capital costs incurred prior to the com-
mencement of primary production will be amortized within 
5–7 years from the date when the agreed targeted rate of 
production is materialized. Capital costs incurred after the 
primary production will be recovered in 5–7 years from the 
time of investment.
2.2  Remuneration
The remuneration fee is the main mechanism through which 
the contractor can get a rate of return. Under a buyback con-
tract, the contractor is paid a fixed fee—a fixed percentage of 
total capital expenditure as agreed in the contract (Madda-
hinasab 2017). Under the IPC, the per barrel remuneration 
fee depends on a number of factors including the location of 
the field, whether the contract covers the exploration phase, 
the oil price, and how much cost the investor has cumula-
tively recovered (R-factor). If a field is located offshore or 
cross the country border, the fee is higher so as to encourage 
investors to accelerate production. Unlike buyback contracts 
where the fee is paid within 5–7 years of production, the 
IPC entitles the contractor to receive the fee from the first 
or incremental production date until the termination of the 
contract, which is typically 15–20 years. Table 1 lists the key 
factors affecting the base fee.
Government
(at least 1-   percent)φ
Gross revenue
Cost oil
(at most   percent)φ
Remuner
ation
Operating
costs
Direct capital
costs
Indirect
capital costs
Investor’s
share
Government
share
Cost of
money
Fig. 1  IPC fiscal structure
7 LIBOR: London interbank offered rate which is a benchmark inter-
est rate at which major global banks lend to one another in the inter-
national interbank market for short-term loans.
8 https ://www.herbe rtsmi thfre ehill s.com/lates t-think ing/the-new-irani 
an-petro leum-contr act-%E2%80%93-gover nment -appro val.
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T h e  R- f a c t o r  i s  d e f i n e d  a s  fo l l o w s : 
R =
Investors cumulative revenue
Investors cumulative expenditures
 . As the R-factor increases, the 
rate of remuneration fee decreases. This relationship pre-
vents the contractor from gaining a windfall profit and is a 
common practice in most oil contracts across the world. The 
specifics of the R-factor adjustment mechanism varies by 
contract. From the contract template, in Table 2 we present 
an example of the IPC R-factor adjustment with hypothetical 
percentage values which will be used for financial modeling. 
In this example, if the base fee is $5 per barrel, it will be 
adjusted to $4.5/bbl if the R-factor is between 1.0 and 2.0, 
and $4/bbl if the R-factor is greater than 2.0.
The remuneration fee is also indexed to international oil 
prices and regional gas prices, although not linearly. The 
fee is indexed to the average export oil price of Iran with the 
following formula:
where AF is the remuneration fee adjusted for the increase 
or decrease in the price of exported oil; F is the contractual 
base fee per barrel; Pt is the annual average price of exported 
oil in year t; and P0 is the export oil price at year zero 
assumed in the contract.9 Hence, the relationship between 
the adjusted remuneration fee and oil price is S-shaped. 
When 0.5P0 < Pt< 1.5P0, the adjusted fee is linear in price. 
When Pt>1.5P0 or Pt < 0.5P0, Eq. (1a) and (1b) effectively 
put a price ceiling and a price floor on the adjusted fee. As 
a result, the remuneration fee is progressive in that when 
the price is high (higher than 150% of the base price), a 
growing share of the net revenue accrues to the government. 
Conversely, when the price is low (lower than 50% of the 
base price), the investor’s interest is protected.
The fee is adjusted for both the R-factor and the price of 
oil in a multiplicative manner. It will be first adjusted by 
(1)AF = F × 0.5 × (1 + Pt∕P0),
(1a)and if Pt > 1.5P0, then Pt = 1.5P0
(1b)If Pt < 0.5P0, then Pt = 0.5P0
the R-factor of the previous quarter, then adjusted by the oil 
price of the current quarter according to the formulae.
3  Model setup
To examine how the fiscal terms of the IPC affect the rent 
distribution between the host government and the investor, 
we develop a cash flow model using technical information 
from the third phase development of a real oilfield located in 
the South of Iran.10 We first compute the net present values 
accrued to both the government and the investor. From the 
net present values, we then calculate the government and 
investor “takes.” The “take” statistics, which summarize the 
shares of profit (total revenue minus total costs) between the 
two parties, is widely used in the industry (Johnston 1994; 
Mu 2020). For the contractor, the “take” is simply the share 
of the contractor’s net profit in the total profit of the project. 
For the government, “take” represents the share of all taxes, 
levies and other government revenues from the project. 
When calculated over the life cycle of a project, the “takes” 
shall be calculated on a present value basis.
3.1  The production profile and cost parameters
The field is estimated to have 5 billion barrels of oil initially 
in place (OOIP) and has been continuously producing for 
13 years. There are currently 27 producing wells, 2 descrip-
tive wells and 4 gas injection wells. The current production 
capacity is 150 thousand barrels per day (MBPD). Accord-
ing to NIOC, the third phase of the development plan aims 
Table 1  Determinants of base remuneration fee
Factors Criteria Adjustment
R-factor The rate of the investor’s cumulative revenue to the 
cumulative costs of the investor in the concerned 
period
Base fee decreases as R increases to avoid wind fall profits to the 
investor
Oil price Base fee increases as oil price rises according to the formulae detailed 
below
Service domain Exploration development and production If the contractor is active in the exploration phase, a one dollar fee is 
added to the base fee to cover the exploration costs
Table 2  R-factor adjustments with hypothetical numbers
$/bbl R < 1.0 1.0 ≤ R < 2.0 2.0 ≤ R
Fee adjustment (of base fee) 100% 90% 80%
10 - The name of the field is removed due to confidentiality limita-
tions.9 The base price is assumed $60/bbl.
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at adding 4 producing wells and 2 appraisal wells in order to 
boost the peak production capacity by 70 MBPD, reaching 
220 MBPD.
Because the field is already in production and no explora-
tion is needed, the length of the contract is set at 20 years 
instead of the maximum of 25 years that is allowed by the 
IPC. The first 3 years of the contract period is for field 
development (e.g., well drilling and completion), while 
the remaining 17 years is for production. According to the 
model contract, the capital cost will be reimbursed to the 
investor within 7 years from the time when the production 
rate reaches the target level. This is the fourth year of the 
contract in this context. The production profile is shown 
in Fig. 2. The base production rate is 150 MBPD and will 
reach 210 MBPD and 220 MBPD in the fourth and fifth 
year, respectively. Once the production rate reaches peak, it 
remains in plateau for 5 years. Afterward, it will deplete at 
a rate of 3% per year. The cumulative incremental produc-
tion from the field is 274.8 million barrels according to the 
technical assumption of the field.
Assumptions for the key economic parameters are sum-
marized in Table 3. For simplicity, all cost figures are 
expressed in real dollar values. The marginal cost for adding 
capacity is assumed 15,700 dollars per barrel of production 
capacity per day, which is reasonable as some of the surface 
facilities (such as tanks, separators, etc.) are already in place. 
A $50 million per year of sustaining capital cost is consid-
ered for well and facility maintenance and working capital. 
The OPEX is assumed 6 dollars per barrel, and the cost of 
money is 6% per year. Indirect capital cost is assumed to 
be 25% of the total CAPEX. The discount rate is 10% per 
year, which is the prevalent discount rate usually accepted by 
international organizations (such as IMF) and international 
oil companies in their public models. As discussed earlier, 
the cost recovery cap is set at 50% of the annual proceeds 
for crude oil.
Based on assumptions about these cost parameters, the 
total undiscounted cost for this production enhancement pro-
ject is about 4613 million dollars, which is equivalent to 16.8 
dollars per barrel. Table 4 summarizes the cost structure.
3.2  Oil price and remuneration fee
To see how the “take” statistics change with the oil prices, we 
consider four scenarios of the oil price: a reference case, a high 
price scenario, a low price scenario and a flat price scenario. 
The reference case, the high price and the low price scenario 
all follow the price projections of the US Energy Information 
Administration (EIA). Figure 3 depicts EIA’s latest projections 
100
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Fig. 2  The production profile. Note: The figure shows the production 
profile of the sample field
Table 3  Economic assumptions
a Required expenditures (repair and maintenance) to keep the produc-
tion stable including well repairs, etc
Economic parameters Units
Cost of adding one barrel of capacity 15,700 $/b/d
Sustaining  capitala 50 $MM/year
Opex 6 $/bbl
Indirect costs (share in Capex) 25%
Discount rate 10%
Cost recovery cap 50% Of revenue
Base fee 5 $/bbl
Table 4  Cost structure of the project
Development (over 3 years of development) 1099.2
Sustaining (over 14 years of production) 700
Operating cost (over 17 years of production) 1375
Total (over 20 years of contract) 3173.2
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Fig. 3  Crude oil price projection (2018 dollar). Note: The figure 
shows the assumptions of crude oil price used in “Annual Energy 
Outlook 2020” (EIA 2020)
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for Brent crude oil price in 2018 real dollars (EIA 2020). In the 
reference case scenario, the Brent oil price starts from $73.27/
bbl in 2020 and gradually increases to $105.16/bbl in 2040. 
In contrast, it grows from $122.92/bbl in 2020 to $197.34/
bbl in 2040 in the high price scenario and from $43.92/bbl 
to $47.75 in the low price scenario. In the flat price scenario, 
we assume the Brent price remains at $65/bbl throughout the 
contract period. To account for the lower quality of the crude 
from this field and the transportation cost, a $5/bbl deduction 
to the Iranian crude is applied in the reference case and in the 
flat price scenario. This deduction is adjusted to $7.5/bbl and 
$3/bbl in the high price and low price scenarios, respectively, 
to reflect changes in the price premium and transportation cost 
for different price scenarios.
As discussed in Sect. 2, the investor’s remuneration fee is 
determined and adjusted on the basis of oil price and R-factor. 
Based on our communications with senior officials of the 
NIOC, we consider a base remuneration fee of $5/bbl with 
a corresponding Iranian exported crude oil price of $60/bbl. 
With regards to the R-factor adjustment, the per barrel remu-
neration fee decreases as the R-factor increases. Figure 4 plots 
the R-factor along with the adjusted fee in the reference case. 
The adjusted fee drops between Year 8 and Year 9 because 
the R-factor reaches 1.0, and the fee is adjusted to 90% of the 
base fee.
Given the above assumptions about oil prices, cost struc-
ture, and production profile, we compute the internal rate of 
return (IRR), net present value (NPV) both for the project as a 
whole and for the investor and government, respectively, under 
different price scenarios.
4  Results
4.1  Main results
Table 5 reports the main results of the simulations for all 
price scenarios. For each price scenario, we compute the 
IRR for the project as a whole and for the oil company, the 
NPVs, respectively, for the project, the oil company and the 
government. To examine the effect of discount rates on the 
net present values and takes, we compute both the undis-
counted NPVs and the discounted NPVs assuming a 10% 
discount rate.
There are several important points worth noting. First, 
looking at the column of IRR, the project IRR is quite high 
and stands at 44% even in the low price scenario. This is 
consistent with the idea that a significant amount of rent 
existent in the upstream petroleum projects. The IRR for the 
contractor is also above its discount rate in all price scenar-
ios, indicating good overall profitability for the contractor.
Second, comparing the second column of undiscounted 
values, the company takes (the shares of the company’s 
profit) is lower in the high oil price scenario than in the 
0
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Fig. 4  R-factor and adjusted remuneration fee
Table 5  Project IRR, NPV and each party’s takes
IRR NPV0, US$ 
Million
NPV10, 
US$ Mil-
lion
High price scenario
 Project 112.51% 41,991 16,706
 Oil company 15.49% 1533 281
 Government 40,458 16,425
 Government, % 96.35% 98.32%
 Company, % 3.65% 1.68%
Reference case
 Project 74.19% 20,064 7728
 Oil company 14.79% 1475 247
 Government 18,589 7482
 Government, % 92.65% 96.81%
 Company, % 7.35% 3.19%
Low price scenario
 Project 44.36% 7847 2850
 Oil company 11.16% 1006 55
 Government 6841 2795
 Government, % 87.18% 98.07%
 Company, % 12.82% 1.93%
Flat price scenario
 Project 63.18% 13,315 5203
 Oil company 13.05% 1225 150
 Government 12,090 5053
 Government, % 90.80% 97.12%
 Company, % 9.20% 2.88%
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reference case and the low price scenario. And it is also 
lower in the reference case than in the low oil price sce-
nario even though the absolute values of the company NPVs 
are higher in the higher oil price scenarios. This is to be 
expected since the remuneration fee is capped when the 
oil price is more than 150% of the base price, which is the 
case in the high price scenario, and the fee is also adjusted 
downwards as the R-factor increases above one. This pattern 
reflects the progressive nature of the fee mechanism.
Third, the third column shows the discounted NPVs and 
the corresponding government and company takes. Similar 
to Column 2, the absolute values of both the government and 
company NPVs are increasing as the oil price moves from 
low to high scenarios. However, although the company take 
in the high price scenario is lower than in the reference case, 
it is also lower in the low price scenario than in the reference 
case, which seems contradictory to the pattern shown in the 
second column. The puzzling result is due to the fact that in 
the low price scenario (in which the price is lower than the 
base price in all periods), the remuneration fee is adjusted 
downwards particularly in later periods when the R-factor 
is above 1.11 When discounted, the lower fee results in a 
smaller share of company takes in the low price scenario.
Furthermore, in the flat price scenario where the Brent 
oil price is assumed to be fixed at $65/bbl throughout the 
contract period, the results such as the IRR and the parties’ 
takes lie between the reference case and the low price sce-
nario, which is not surprising given that the assumed crude 
oil price ($65/bbl) lies between the two price scenarios.
Finally, across all price scenarios, the contractor’s takes 
are below 5% in all cases. The relatively low contractor’s 
take reveals that, from a financial perspective, the IPC 
resembles more a service contract than a profit sharing con-
tract. A study by Tordo (2007) shows that the average final 
take of the contractors in service contracts in the world is 
around 2%–10%, while it is above 15% in PSCs. Figure 5 
illustrates the share of each party’s net cash flow for the 
entire contract period for the reference case. If the primary 
goal of introducing the IPC is to attract more foreign invest-
ment into the Iranian oil and gas sector, the results indicate 
that the IPC is unlikely to be effective given the low share of 
company takes. Nonetheless, extension of the contract term 
would still be welcomed by the investors.
4.2  Sensitivity analysis
Our last exercise is to examine the sensitivity of each par-
ty’s profitability and takes on changes in oil price, CAPEX, 
OPEX and the fee. To fix ideas, we use the flat price scenario 
as the base case for sensitivity analysis. Recall that in the 
flat price scenario the oil price is fixed at $65/bbl throughout 
the contract period. This helps us isolate the effect of price 
changes over time from changes in other factors. For each 
sensitivity case, we vary the parameters of interest, i.e., oil 
price, the fee, CAPEX and OPEX, from their base case by 
50–200%, while holding other parameters constant from the 
base case.
Oil price
The sensitivity of each party’s net present values and ‘takes’ 
on changes in the benchmark oil prices is depicted in Fig. 6. 
As the benchmark oil price (Brent) varies from 50% to 200% 
of the base case ($65/bbl), both the government and the con-
tractor’s NPVs increase. Because of the kinks built in the fee 
adjustment formula, the contractor’s NPV grows quickest 
when the oil price is below 60% of the base case and flattens 
when it is above 150% of the base case. In comparison, the 
government NPV is almost linearly increasing as oil price 
increases.
Figure 6b shows the sensitivity of the ‘takes’ to changes 
in the oil price. If the benchmark oil price is 50% of the 
base case, i.e., $32.5/bbl, then the contractor has a nega-
tive NPV and therefore a negative ‘take.’ As the oil price 
increases, both the contractor and the government NPVs 
increase. Because the contractor’s remuneration fee is 
capped when the oil price is above 150% of the base year 
oil price and because the fee is adjusted to 0.9 from 1.0 
as the R-factor crosses the 100% threshold, the share of 
company’s take declines when the oil price is higher than 
150% of the base case crude oil price.
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Fig. 5  Government and company cash flow. Note: The figure depicts 
the shares of net cash flow of the host government and the contractor 
in the reference case scenario
11 In the low price scenario, the adjusted fee ranges $3.76–3.86 per 
barrel from year 9.
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Base remuneration fee
When the base remuneration fee increases, the NPV of the 
contractor increases and that of the government decreases 
(Fig. 7a). Figure 7a also indicates that when the base 
remuneration fee falls below 80% of the assumed base fee 
of $5/bbl, the NPV of the contractor becomes negative. 
Similarly, as the base remuneration fee increases, the con-
tractor’s take increases and that of government decreases 
(Fig. 7b). The remuneration fee is the main mechanism 
through which the contractor can obtain a share of profit. 
As the base remuneration fee changes, the contractor’s 
NPV and its share in the total project NPV change linearly 
in correspondence to the fee change.
CAPEX and OPEX
The sensitivity of both parties NPVs and takes to changes 
in the capital expenditure is depicted in Fig.  8. Not 
surprisingly, as the capital expenditure increases, holding 
other things constant, both the government and contractor’s 
NPVs decrease (Fig. 8a). The ‘takes’ depicted in Fig. 8b, on 
the other hand, show that as the capital expenditure increases 
(i.e., the total profitability of the project decreases) the gov-
ernment takes an increasing share of the discounted profit 
from the project while the contractor’s ‘take’ is declining. 
This is primarily due to the effect of discounting. Recall 
that the capital expenditure incurs in the development phase 
which is in the early years of the contract. The cash in-flow 
of the company (contractor) depends on the repayment of 
capital cost12 and the remuneration fee, both of which only 
occur in the production phase. As the benchmark oil price is 
fixed, the remuneration fee per barrel is largely fixed and the 
total remuneration accruing to the contractor changes with 
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Fig. 7  a The sensitivity of each party’s NPV to remuneration fee. b The sensitivity of each party’s take to remuneration fee. Note: The figure 
shows the sensitivity of each party’s take and NPV to changes in the base remuneration fee from 50% to 200% of the base case, assuming 10% 
discount rate. In each panel, the government NPV (take) is depicted on the left axis, whereas the contractor’s is on the right axis
12 Recall, the capital cost is amortized over a period of 7 years from 
the time when the daily production rate reaches a certain threshold.
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the production profile. Thus, if the CAPEX increases, it has 
a larger impact on the contractor’s net present value than on 
that of the government.
Figure 9a, b depicted the sensitivity of the parties NPVs 
and takes to changes in the operating expenditure. The 
pattern is similar to the sensitivity of CAPEX exhibited 
in Fig. 8. As the OPEX increases, holding other things 
constant, both the government and the contractor’s NPVs 
decrease (Fig. 9a). Similar to an increase in CAPEX, an 
increase in OPEX leads to a declining share of the contrac-
tor’s take and increasing share of the government take due 
to the discount rate effect.
In sum, the sensitivity analysis indicates, in general, as 
the profitability of the project improves, the government 
takes a larger share of the profit. Thus, the fiscal regime 
under the IPC is generally progressive rather than regressive.
5  Conclusion
This paper analyzes the fiscal regime under the new Iranian 
Petroleum Contract which evolves from the traditional buy-
back contract. There are both similarities and differences 
between the IPC and the buyback contract. Like buyback 
contracts, the contractor under the IPC regime recovers its 
direct and indirect capital cost, operating costs, banking 
costs and remuneration from the proceeds of the field. There 
are three differences between this contract and buyback. 
Firstly, there is no limit for CAPEX when the contract is 
signed. Secondly, the contractor’s remuneration is not fixed 
and depends on the production level and R-factor which is 
similar to Iraq’s service contracts. Thirdly, the term of the 
contract is extended to the production phase to incentivize 
the contractor for long-term behavior.
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A financial model using technical information from the 
third phase development of an oil field located in the South 
of Iran is developed. There are two key results from this 
exercise. First, across all price scenarios, the contractor’s 
‘take’ is relatively low—below 5%, indicating that the IPC 
resembles more a service contract than a production sharing 
contract. Second, in general the IPC is progressive in the 
sense that as the overall profitability of the project improves 
the government takes an increasing share of the economic 
rent. A sensitivity analysis of each party’s profitability and 
takes on oil price, CAPEX, OPEX and the fee corroborates 
the result.
Our analysis has profound policy implications for both 
the investors and the host government. First, although the 
IPC has introduced a number of changes to the contract 
term, CAPEX allowance and remuneration that could be 
welcomed by investors, the contractor’s take under the IPC 
is not much different from traditional service contracts and 
is unlikely to prove effective in attracting foreign investment. 
Second, since the remuneration fee is the main mechanism 
through which an investor can obtain a return, it is impor-
tant that the investor negotiates a favorable remuneration 
fee. Third, our sensitivity analysis indicates that the govern-
ment take is more sensitive to the fee, capital expenditure 
than the operating expenses. Thus, the hosting government 
must focus on the fee and the CAPEX rather than operat-
ing expenses in contract negotiations. On the other hand, 
if the government aims to improve the overall profitability 
the project hence the rent, they should also target capital 
expenditures instead of operating costs.
For future research, there are a number of avenues that 
this analysis can be extended. First, it would be useful to 
study the investor’s optimal behavior using a dynamic model 
where the investor’s investment and production decisions 
can be modeled as choice variables in response to the oil 
price, the remuneration fee and other contractual factors. 
Such a model could provide additional insight on how the 
contractual arrangements influence an investor’s behavior. 
Second, given the significant uncertainty in the oil price 
movement and other technical parameters such as the pro-
duction rate, a stochastic simulation with the key variables 
would help quantify the range of possible outcomes and aid 
decision making for both the contractor and the hosting gov-
ernment under uncertainty.13 Lastly, it would also be inter-
esting to incorporate the technical aspects of the field into 
the financial modeling.14 Since the contractual parameters 
(such as the fee and its sliding scale) vary with field techni-
cal difficulty, a model integrating the technical parameters 
of the field with contractual parameters could provide more 
accurate estimate of the contract implications.
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